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ABSTRACT
The growing demand for healthcare services combined with the disarray in the
health insurance market in the United States has created a situation where rival
health networks are aggressively competing by building duplicate health facilities
and providing redundant services in localized geographic regions. Unfortunately,
this strategy can reduce the quality of patient care and decrease profits (Kaissi &
Charland, 2013). A solution to this problem is for health networks to cooperate and
share healthcare equipment, facilities, and personnel. Toward that end, this paper
presents a game-theoretic method that can share these costs in a fair, efficient, and
repeatable manner.
KEYWORDS: Cooperative game-theory, Shapley simplification, joint venture,
healthcare networks

INTRODUCTION
The healthcare industry in the United States is in disarray. The combination of an
aging population, instability in the insurance market due to the uncertainty of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), soaring healthcare costs due, in part, to excessive
litigation, and inefficient “fee-for-service” billing practices have created a very
difficult situation for all healthcare stakeholders. Insurance companies struggle to
determine how much to charge for coverage while physicians feel hamstrung in
their ability to provide proper care within the limitations of insurance coverage.
Hospital administrators attempt to balance the needs of patients, care-givers, and
stockholders while still adhering to government rules and regulations. Finally,
patients are forced to navigate a byzantine system where they are often required to
purchase a service without having any idea how much it will cost or who will pay
for it. Clearly, this is far from an optimal situation.
A conspicuous consequence of this chaotic environment is the proliferation of
healthcare provider facilities by competing health networks, often within relatively
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small geographic areas (Levine & Linder, 2016). The primary intent of this strategy
is to capture insured (i.e., paying) customers through convenience and proximity to
services (Chang, et al., 2015; Fine & Frazier, 2011). This is especially true for
emergency trauma facilities, since rules exist that require transport to the closest
trauma center with the appropriate trauma-level rating. On the surface, this tactic
appears beneficial to consumers because competition normally lowers prices while
easier access to services should be advantageous to healthcare customers.
However, an unintended consequence of this trend is that it can lead to a situation
where costs for health services increase, provider profits decrease, and community
access to healthcare services potentially can be eroded (Kaissi, et al., 2013; Weiss,
2004). This is due, in part, to the unnecessary duplication of expensive healthcare
equipment, facilities, and personnel. By working independently and eschewing
cooperation, rival healthcare networks are missing a potential synergy that would
benefit all.
A better, more economically rational approach would be for competing health
networks to share the cost of expensive medical equipment, facilities, and personnel
through cooperative joint ventures so that all can utilize these resources in an
efficient manner. While not a universal solution to all the problems mentioned
above, it could mitigate the costly consequence of healthcare resource duplication.
Doing so would not violate the intent of existing antitrust legislation (Leibenluft,
2015). In addition, profitable operations could still continue through specialized
services and dedicated facilities while the customer base as a whole would benefit
through decreased costs.
Unfortunately, this ideal solution has been difficult to achieve because it requires a
method that is perceived as both fair and neutral to divide the cost of those
healthcare resources among the competing participants. This allocation algorithm
would also need to be understandable and repeatable to incentivize participants to
maintain a stable coalition. With this in mind, the primary motivation for this
research project is to introduce a cost sharing method with these characteristics and
to determine its viability in a realistic competitive healthcare scenario. This will
not only help competing healthcare services in the United States, but is also
applicable to healthcare systems that are more closely managed by the government
in other countries.

THE HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATOR’S PERSPECTIVE
The factors responsible for the proliferation of healthcare facilities and services are
extremely complex and cannot be understood merely by performing a review of the
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literature. Consequently, the initial step taken in this project was to contact and
interview the Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of three regional healthcare
networks. The CEOs each had over 30 years of healthcare administrative
experience and oversee, in total, thirteen acute and critical care hospitals in the
Colorado and Wyoming region. The intent of the interviews was to gather their
perspectives on the current healthcare environment and to gauge their reaction to
the notion of sharing the cost of healthcare resources. Overall, the CEO’s
responses, which are summarized below, were surprisingly consistent and were
quite useful in focusing this research on areas where it has the best chance for
successful implementation.
Extreme Competition
The CEOs confirmed that the level of competition in the healthcare market is very
high. One used the word “predatory” to describe the interaction between competing
networks while another used the word “ferocious.” When asked about healthcare
construction, one mentioned that the current flurry of construction of new facilities
was not based on anticipated demand, but rather was intended to lure customers
from the other networks. While it is true that demand for healthcare services is
growing, the CEOs related that consumer demand is not growing fast enough to
justify the current level of new construction projects.
Healthcare Culture
Each CEO stated that the healthcare culture does not naturally encourage sharing
and cooperation. One said that he could not think of a single case where two
competing health networks had decided to collaborate on a joint purchasing
venture. This indicates that there is a strong streak of independence in the
healthcare profession. This is particularly true with physicians, who generally like
to think of themselves as autonomous agents. This tendency is tempered by the
reality that they require access to expensive hospital resources to practice medicine;
however, there is still a residual culture that resists sharing unless necessary.
Evidence of this can be found in the adherence to the inefficient and confusing “feefor-service” billing practice favored by the industry. Despite this, the CEOs were
united in their optimism that the culture was changing and that cooperative ventures
were inevitable given the expense of new technology and the impact of the
Affordable Care Act.
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Dynamic Environment
It goes without saying that the healthcare environment is dynamic. New medical
procedures are continually being developed and the legal landscape of healthcare
insurance in the United States is rapidly changing. Because of this, the CEOs
interviewed were hesitant to give specific predictions about the level or type of
resource sharing that is likely to occur. However, all were confident that joint
ventures would Increase and that healthcare would improve for consumers in the
future.
“Medical Arms Race”
A common theme voiced during the interviews was that healthcare networks are
engaged in a “medical arms race” that requires competing networks to acquire the
latest medical equipment in an effort to demonstrate their cutting-edge status. As
one CEO put it, “First we had to have MRI machines, then we had to have PET
scanners, now everybody expects us to have Di Vinci [robot surgery] devices.”
Modern medical equipment is extremely expensive and, according to the
interviews, not always efficiently utilized; however, from a marketing standpoint it
is required to present the image of a healthcare network on the “bleeding-edge” of
technology. The downside of this race is that the utilization of these devices is
generally too low to recoup fully the initial cost before the next new technology is
introduced. This was viewed by one of the CEOs as a factor that will encourage
resource sharing in the future.
Healthcare Marketing
Competing health networks are very concerned about the perceived marketing
image of their brand. The image they want to project is one of professional
competence, caring, convenience, and high technology. Along these lines, the
convenience factor is a prime motivator for new construction projects. The
rationale is that placing healthcare facilities near the customer has a better chance
of capturing market share. One CEO related a story about how the location for a
new hospital facility was chosen specifically because it was mid-way between two
hospitals of a competing chain, effectively diminishing the convenience of the
competition. Based upon the interviews, it is obvious that this type of thinking is a
prime reason why collaborative ventures have been rare in the past.
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Other Constraints to Cooperation
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the CEOs identified additional barriers
to cooperation. First are the rules used to accredit trauma centers into the various
trauma levels within the system. Achievement of a particular trauma center level
depends on the on-site availability of specific resources and personnel. Centers
with the higher trauma levels provide more elaborate services. If a center depends
on remote, shared resources it would likely be certified at a lower trauma level
which would reduce its status in the region. Given that trauma patients are usually
admitted into the hospital associated with the center, this could reduce patient
counts and profits. A second constraint to collaborative ventures relates to the
population density of the geographic area. Some medical services that could easily
be shared in a high-density metropolitan area cannot in rural areas where the
distance between care units is unreasonably large. Essentially, the level of care
would decrease if patients were expected to travel long distances to utilized shared
services and resources. Finally, there is concern about anti-trust legislation and
how existing anti-trust laws will be applied in the new era of the Affordable Care
Act. While the ACA encourages cooperation and consolidation, there is a good
deal of ambiguity concerning how the courts will interpret its application. The
CEOs are wary of running afoul of government regulators and facing an anti-trust
lawsuit. The primary take-away from these concerns was that cooperative sharing
is desirable but cannot be all-encompassing across all healthcare resources. Thus,
the constraints listed above impose boundaries on the viable sharing options.
Likely Sharing Opportunities
The information gathered through the interviews indicated that cooperative joint
ventures for all medical resources is unlikely; however, the CEOs did have several
suggestions on areas where sharing across competing networks is possible and
desirable. Specifically, the shared clinic facility building could be shared if
centrally located along with medical imaging equipment (e.g., MRI, PET scan, Di
Vinci devices) as long as it was scheduled appropriately. This would not be feasible
for trauma centers due to the certification rules, but could work in other, nonemergency settings, especially in densely populated metropolitan areas. In
addition, specialized personnel such as radiologists and surgeons were prime
candidates for sharing since they can be scheduled and their skills shared across
multiple locations. Finally, ancillary services such as ambulance, pharmacy,
laundry, data processing, insurance, and bill collections were identified as likely
candidates for cost sharing. Based on this knowledge, these are the areas on which
this research focused.
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PRIOR RESEARCH
A large body of research exists concerning the various ways to share the cost of
cooperative joint ventures. A key concern throughout this literature is that these
costs be shared in a “fair” manner that creates a stable coalition. That is, a sharing
solution where there is no incentive to break away from the coalition and proceed
independently. Solutions with this characteristic are formerly said to be in the core.
Sharing solutions without a core are possible, but there would be economic pressure
for one or more of the participants to leave the coalition, so they tend to be less
stable (Buchholz, Haupt, & Peters, 2014). Other desirable characteristics include a
solution that is efficient (i.e., fully allocates the cost or savings), repeatable (i.e.,
not negotiated), and understandable. Of these characteristics, the one that is most
ambiguous is that the allocation be “fair.” This is due to the fact that fairness is in
the eye of the beholder and is often a severe obstacle to cooperation (Cruijssen,
Cools, & Dullaert, 2007). Common perspectives on fairness include the following
(Kolker, 2014; Thomson, 2016):
•
•
•
•

Equal division – Share the cost equally among all participants. This is
sometimes called egalitarian division.
Proportional division – Allocate the cost in proportion to some other factor such
as gross sales or proportional use of the resource.
Negotiated division – Share the cost based on cooperation and compromise.
Pareto Optimal division – Divide the cost or savings in a balanced way so that
no one can benefit without harming other participants in the joint venture.

Egalitarian methods tend to be unstable because the solution would seldom be in
the core and some participants could fare better by proceeding independently.
Likewise, proportional division tends to generate solutions that vary significantly
from stability (Özener, Ergun, & Savelsbergh, 2013; Verdonck, Beullens, Caris,
Ramaekers, & Janssens, 2016). Negotiated division can produce stable results that
are efficient, but the negotiation process is time-consuming and costly and the
results may not be repeatable due to the dynamic nature of the process (Bond &
Gasser, 1988). Hence, for the purposes of this research, the Pareto Optimal
approach to fairness will be pursued because it is the most likely to produce stable,
predictable, and repeatable solutions. It is also the approach that best aligns with
the competitive healthcare environment described by the hospital CEOs.
Surprisingly, given the large number of possible cost sharing methods, the literature
in this area has focused on relatively few approaches with the desirable theoretical
and empirical characteristics mentioned above (Anshelevich et al., 2008). Of these,
the Nucleolus and the Shapley value are the two most promising (Kolker, 2014;
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Owen, 1995). Both the Nucleolus and the Shapley value can produce stable,
efficient, unique (i.e., single point) solutions that would be in the core for joint
ventures in the healthcare environment (Fiestras-Janeiro, Garcia-Jurado, &
Mosquera, 2011; Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; Schmeidler, 1969). These solutions
would also be Pareto Optimal and repeatable. However, a key concern with the
Nucleolus approach is that it is not a formula-based calculation. It instead relies on
complex iterative linear programming techniques that can be difficult to setup and
apply (Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016; Kolker, 2018). In addition, it can produce
solutions where some participants pay less if the total cost increases or pay more if
the total cost decreases, thus setting up undesirable incentives (Kolker, 2018). This
limits its usefulness in real-world situations. Consequently, the Shapley value was
the method chosen for this research project because it exhibits all the desirable
solution characteristics and is considered fair (in the Pareto Optimal sense),
equitable, stable, and neutral by virtually all researchers (Boatsman, Hansen, &
Kimbrell, 1981; Frechette, et al., 2016).

SHAPLEY VALUE COST SHARING
The Shapley value is a game-theoretic approach that provides a potential solution
to the cost allocation problem addressed by this research. The Shapley value was
developed by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 as an algorithmic way for players in an
abstract game to determine the outcome of that game prior to actually playing it
(Shapley, 1953). Since its development, the Shapley value has been used in a wide
variety of real-world contexts. It has, for example, been used in the areas of
electricity transmission allocation, freight transportation, natural resource sharing,
determining uncertainty factors in simulation models, and evaluating deposit
insurance premiums (Fiestras-Janeiro, et al., 2011; Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016;
Song, Nelson, & Staum, 2016; Staum, 2012). In the healthcare context, it has been
used to identify gene sub-groups prominent in ovarian cancer research, optimize
supply chain networks for hospitals, and help reduce false alarms in intensive care
units (Afghah, Razi, & Najarian, 2015; Mohebbi, 2015; Razi, Afghah, & Varadan,
2015).
The result generated by the Shapley value is a unique, single-point solution that
allocates to each participant the average of the marginal cost that participant creates
by joining the collaborative venture (Guajardo & Rönnqvist, 2016). Said another
way, the Shapley value generates a solution that is at the “center of gravity of the
extreme points of core” when the core exists (Shapley, 1971). The formula to
calculate the Shapley value is given below (Shapley, 1953).

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017

8

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

Volume 27, Number 3 2018

(𝑠−1)! (𝑛−𝑠)!

𝑥𝑖 = ∑𝑠 [
] ∗ [𝑐(𝑆) − 𝑐(𝑆 − [𝑖])] (1)
𝑛!
Where:
c = coalitions of players
n = number of players in the “grand coalition”
n! = number of coalition permutations
i = an individual player
s = number of coalitions containing i
xi = cost allocated to player i
c(S) = coalition containing S
[c(S) - c(S-[i])] = contribution that an individual player makes to a
coalition
The Shapley formula is relatively easy to apply, so it has the benefit of being
understandable and repeatable. Its use, however, has been somewhat limited
because the information requirements needed to calculate the value grow
exponentially as the number of players (i.e., participants) in the joint venture
increases. For example, the Shapley value requires the development of 2 n – 1 cost
sharing scenarios where ‘n’ is the number of participants in the joint venture. So,
a 4-player game (i.e., joint venture) requires 15 cost scenarios, a 5-player game
requires 31, and so on. For any collaborative venture with more than a few
participants, the information requirements quickly become overwhelming. A
solution to this limitation is to utilize simplifications to the Shapley value that have
been developed for special classes of problems. These simplifications generate
identical allocations for any number of players without the corresponding
computation and information burden. Consequently, because of the favorable
characteristics of the Shapley value and the existence of Shapley simplifications
that can overcome the primary limitation to using it in practical contexts, the
remainder of this research focuses on using Shapley simplifications to share the
cost of healthcare collaborative ventures.

SHAPLEY SIMPLIFICATIONS
The healthcare environment described by the CEOs identified categories of
resources that could be shared by three Shapley simplifications. As mentioned
previously, these simplifications generate the same results as the full Shapley value,
but do not have unreasonable input data requirements. Specifically, the data input
requirements grow linearly with the number of players rather than exponentially.
This characteristic allows the value to be calculated for much larger, realistic-sized,
joint ventures. The sections below introduce the simplifications and the Appendix
of this paper demonstrates their potential use in sharing the cost of healthcare
resources.
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PARALLEL SYSTEM SIMPLIFICATION
Littlechild and Owen (1973) developed a simplification for classes of shared
resources with overlapping requirements where the cost to any subset of players is
equal to the cost to the largest player.
If a game vs has the structure

𝑎
𝑏
𝑐
vs = 𝑏
𝑐
𝑐
[𝑐 ]

where a ≤ b ≤ c, then its Shapley value is:
1
x1 = a
x2 =
x3 =

3
1

3
1
3

a +
a +

1
2
1
2

(b – a)

(2)

(b – a) + (c – b)

SERIAL SYSTEM SIMPLIFICATION
The cost of another class of resources can be shared by determining the total
quantity of the resource required and multiplying it by the cost for each “unit.” This
is appropriate for resources that are independently purchased and used solely by
each player in the game. Using this simplification produces the same sharing
solution as using the full Shapley value (Lightfoot, 1990).
If a game vs has the structure

𝑎
𝑏
𝑐
vs = 𝑎 + 𝑏
𝑎+𝑐
𝑏+𝑐
[𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐 ]

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017

10

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

Volume 27, Number 3 2018

then its Shapley value is:
x1 = a
x2 = b
x3 = c

(3)

STEPWISE SERIAL SIMPLIFICATION
Some resources must be purchased in pre-determined, indivisible quantities or
capacities. For example, if a coalition of healthcare providers wants to share the
cost of several ultrasound devices, these machines must be acquired in whole
“units,” that is, no partial ultrasound devices can be purchased. So, if 3.3 ultrasound
machines were needed by the joint venture, the coalition would buy 4 to satisfy the
demand. This type of “lumpy” resource can be shared using the stepwise serial
simplification as shown below (Lightfoot, 1990).
If a game vs has the structure
𝑣(1)
𝑣(2)
𝑣(3)
vs = 𝑣(12)
=
𝑣(13)
𝑣(23)
[𝑣(123)]

𝑚1
𝑚2
𝑚3
𝑚12
𝑚13
𝑚23
[𝑚123]

= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥b}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥c}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+b}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+c}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥b+c}
= Cost of min {Mk:Mk≥a+b+c}

where M1, M2, … are the available resource sizes, then its Shapley value is:
1
x1 =m1 + 2 (m12-m1-m2)
+
+
x2 = m2 +
+
+
x3 = m3 +
+
+
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2
1

3
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
3

(m13-m1-m3)
(m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3))
(m12-m1-m2)
(m23-m2-m3)

(4)

(m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3))
(m13-m1-m3)
(m23-m2-m3)
(m123-(m12+m13+m23-m1-m2-m3))
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All three simplifications, when applied to the proper class of resource, will result
in a sharing solution identical to what would be produced using the full Shapley
value. In addition, all three are generalizable to sharing coalitions with any number
of players. This removes the primary limitation to using Shapley allocations in
practical contexts. The following section will demonstrate its use in a healthcare
example.

APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH
For this illustration, assume that three competing hospitals form a joint venture to
share the cost of a centralized imaging clinic with DNA sequencing capabilities in
a large metropolitan area. The initial arrangement is to share the cost of the clinic
facility, a CT scanner, DNA sequencers, a team of radiologists, computers, and
laundry service. Later, depending upon the success of the collaboration, the cost of
other resources could be shared. The characteristics of the shared resources are
described below.
•

•

•

•

The three hospitals have overlapping requirements for the clinic facility with
hospital A needing a 9,000 ft2 facility and hospitals B and C requiring 15,000
ft2 and 19,000 ft2 respectively. The building is estimated to have a final cost of
$400 per square foot to complete. Given that a large percentage of the clinic is
devoted to waiting rooms and administrative offices, the group agreed that the
19,000 ft2 building will satisfy all three.
Radiologist cost an average of $400,000 per year in the metropolitan area.
Hospital A anticipates a workload requiring .8 of a full-time radiologist while
hospital B would need 2.1 and C would require 2.7. Since radiologists can only
be “purchased” in whole units, the clinic will hire a team of 6 radiologists to
handle the workload.
Laundry service, while a minor clinic expense, is representative of several
ancillary services that could eventually be shared. Laundry service can be
purchased for 60 cents a pound with a 10% quantity discount on loads exceeding
500 pounds. Hospital A anticipates generating 50 pounds of laundry a week
and B and C will produce 150 and 175 pounds per week respectively. This
shared total will not qualify for the quantity discount, so the cost sharing
allocation will use the serial simplification initially. Later, if the volume
exceeds 500 pounds, the stepwise simplification can be used to allocate the cost.
The clinic requires a shared CT scanner, several DNA sequencers, and
computers for the staff. The resource details and associated costs of these
resources are provided in the Appendix of this paper. The Appendix also
demonstrates how to apply the simplifications to calculate a cost sharing
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solution. The results of all the cost allocations in the joint venture are shown in
Table 1. This table also shows what the cost to each hospital and the collective
would have been without the joint venture.

Table 1: Cost Allocation for 3-Hospital Example
Resource

CT
Scanner
DNA
Sequenc
ers
Laundry
Service

Compute
rs

Radiolog
ist

Clinic
Facility

Purchase
Scenario

No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation
No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation
No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation
No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation
No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation
No Joint
Venture
Shapley
Allocation

No Joint
Total
Venture
Allocatio
Shapley
n$
Allocation

Hospital A
$

Hospital B
$

Hospital C
$

400,000

1,000,000

2,500,000

133,333.3
3

433,333.3
3

1,933,333
.33

2,550,000

1,700,000

850,000

1,983,333
.33

1,558,333
.33

708,333.3
3

3,900,00
0
2,500,00
0
5,100,00
0
4,250,00
0

300

390

570

1,260

300

390

570

1,260

25,000

44,000

63,000

132,000

18,933.33

33,533.33

54,733.33

107,200

400,000

1,200,000

1,200,000

333,333.3
3

933,333.3
3

1,133,333
.33

3,600,000

6,000,000

7,600,000

1,200,000

2,400,000

4,000,000

6,975,300

9,944,390

12,213,57
0

3,669,233

5,358,923

7,830,303
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Total
Cost $

Simplificat
ion

2,800,00
0
2,400,00
0
17,200,0
00
7,600,00
0

Parallel

Stepwise

Serial

Stepwise

Stepwise

Parallel

29,133,2
60
16,858,4
60
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DISCUSSION
The key to using the Shapley value to allocate resource costs for cooperating
healthcare providers is to classify the individual resources based upon their
characteristics and then apply the appropriate simplification to each. These
individual costs can then be added together to determine the total cost allocated to
each participant. This not only makes the problem computationally easier, but also
aligns with the sharing environment described by the hospital administrators. If the
resources are not treated separately, a Shapley solution can still be calculated, but
it would require creating 2 n - 1 coalition cost scenarios and using the original
Shapley formula. While not a major problem in the proof-of-concept clinic
example, a larger coalition of hospitals would require an unreasonable number of
scenarios. Thus, the simplifications allow Shapley value allocations to be applied
in a real-world context.
The three-hospital solution shown in Table 1 shares the cost of six resources. The
table provides the outcome of using the Shapley simplifications and of proceeding
independently for each resource. Based on the results shown in Table 1, each
hospital, and the collective as a whole, will save a significant amount of money by
cooperating. Three of these resources are shared using the stepwise simplification,
two are shared with the parallel simplification, and one uses the serial
simplification. The decision concerning which simplification to use depends on the
characteristics of the resource. For example, the stepwise simplification was used
for the DNA sequencer, computer, and radiologist resources because each of these
must be purchased in whole units. You cannot buy a fractional DNA sequencer;
consequently, the general rule for this category is that the cost of any medical
resource that must be purchased in indivisible units (with or without quantity
discount) can be shared using the stepwise simplification. The CT scanner and the
clinic facility were shared using the parallel simplification because a larger resource
(i.e., a bigger building and more advanced CT scanner) would satisfy the needs of
the hospitals with more modest requirements. For this category, the general rule is
to use the parallel simplification when a larger capacity resource can satisfy users
with smaller requirements. Finally, the serial simplification was used for the shared
laundry service. This resource is representative of a category of ancillary services
that would need to be shared to create a workable joint venture. It would not be
reasonable to expect each hospital to independently contract with a separate laundry
service for the clinic. Even if sharing the cost of laundry services did not save any
money, the logistics and complexity of not sharing would be burdensome.
(However, with sufficient volume, quantity discounts would likely be offered which
would result in a cost savings.) The same would be true for similar clinic functions
such as bill collection and pharmacy services. So, the serial simplification is
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applicable for those healthcare situations where the service/resource is required, the
units of service used are variable and divisible, and it would be impractical not to
cooperate in the purchase.

FUTURE RESEARCH
The research presented in this paper was intended to show proof-of-concept and the
viability of the cost sharing technique in a realistic hospital scenario. The resource
requirements used in the case scenario were derived directly from information
provided by the hospital CEOs. Likewise, the prices used in the case were based
on the current actual cost of the equipment and resources listed in the scenario. The
cost sharing method is applicable to coalitions of any size due to the characteristics
of the Shapley Value and its simplifications; consequently, it is not limited to the
“3-player game” used in the example case. Given this, the first phase of the research
project was successful.
Subsequent work on this project will involve communicating the results of the
research to the hospital CEOs originally interviewed. The intent is to gauge their
acceptance of the approach and to collect more information about possible
applications. This information will be used to refine the technique and possibly
account for other real-world factors such as the impact when hospitals of
significantly different sizes cooperate and how the method could be used when
healthcare networks merge. These are realistic considerations that will make the
technique more robust. The outcome of this phase of the research project will
hopefully lead to its application in an actual healthcare cost sharing venture.

CONCLUSION
The healthcare industry is currently underutilizing its capital and human resources
by pursuing unnecessary, and economically unwise, competition. The result of this
strategy has been shown to decrease provider profits and negatively impact the
quality of patient care (Kaissi & Charland, 2013). It is possible and desirable for
competing health networks to cooperate in targeted joint ventures to mitigate this
problem. Toward that end, this paper has demonstrated an approach using
simplifications of the Shapley value that will make it easier to setup stable
collaborative joint ventures between competing healthcare networks.
The application of this approach was illustrated using a realistic example where
three hospitals cooperated to share the cost of an imaging clinic. The results of
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applying the Shapley simplifications to the example confirm that the sharing
solution produced is stable because each hospital saves money by cooperating and
no hospital (or sub-group of hospitals) can do better by breaking away from the
joint venture. In addition, the solution is fair, in the Pareto Optimal sense, because
no hospital can be allocated a smaller cost without another hospital having to pay
more. It divides the total cost of the resources (no more, no less) and is formulabased, so it is efficient and repeatable. Finally, the solution produced for the clinic
is understandable in that it does not require knowledge of game theory or advanced
mathematics to apply.
The Shapley simplifications themselves do not have unreasonable input data
requirements; therefore, they overcome the primary limitation to applying the
Shapley value to non-trivial problems. For the Serial and Parallel simplifications,
one data value is needed for each player in the coalition; so, a 10-player coalition
would only need 10 input data values. The Stepwise simplification does require
2n – 1 inputs; however, only one value for each player must be provided. The
remaining inputs can be generated by merely adding together and rounding up the
requirements of the individual players to the next whole unit. Thus, the approach
is computationally feasible for large joint ventures where economies of scale are
greater.
There are limits to the type of resources that could, in practice, be shared in a
collaboration among competing healthcare networks. As previously noted,
emergency room trauma centers are not good candidates for resource sharing due
to certification requirements. Also, services where real-time turn-around is
required would not easily be shared. For example, tissue pathology diagnosis is
often required during surgery to determine if more aggressive procedures are
required. The lab performing the diagnosis of the samples needs to be close to the
surgery center, so a remote shared pathology lab would not work. Also, sharing
any critical medical resource in remote rural areas is problematic due to the travel
time involved in reaching the shared site. Despite these situations where sharing in
not feasible, a broad range of other collaborative opportunities are available. By
utilizing the approach introduced in this paper, it will be possible for competing
healthcare networks to take advantage of the economic synergies available through
collaboration and cooperation.
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APPENDIX
The calculations below apply the Shapley simplifications to several of the resources
listed in the 3-hospital case. Note: a “3-player” joint venture scenario was used to
demonstrate the viability of the cost sharing method. While the simplifications
produce results identical to using the full Shapley value with coalitions of any size,
this case was limited to three hospitals to reduce the complexity of the example.

CT SCANNER
Parallel Simplification: The three hospital networks will purchase and share use
of a new Aquilion One Vision CT scanner. Hospital X1 has modest generalimaging requirements and wants a 16-slice scanner ($400,000) to meet their needs.
Hospital X2 has higher volume requirements and also wishes to offer vascular
imaging services which need better quality images, so they require a 128-slice
system ($1,000,000). Finally, hospital X3 wishes to setup a cutting-edge imaging
facility capable of high volume cardio studies; consequently, they require a 640slice scanner ($2,500,000). Given the expected usage volume, all three hospitals
could share a single 640-slice machine with this cost allocation.
Resource Cost
16-slice:
$ 400,000
128-slice: $ 1,000,000
640-slice: $ 2,500,000

Player Requirement
S(1): 16-slice $400,000
S(2): 128-slice $1,000,000
S(3): 640-slice $2,500,000

Cost to “go it alone”
X1 = 400,000
X2 = 1,000,000
X3 = 2,500,000
==========
$ 3,900,000

Shapley Sharing Solution
X1 = ⅓ (400,000)
= 133,333.33
X2 = ⅓(400,000) + ½(1,000,000 – 400,000)
= 433,333.33
X3 = ⅓(400,000) + ½(1,000,000 – 400,000) + (2,5000,000 – 1,000,000) = 1,933,333.34
============
$ 2,500,000.00

AUTOMATED DNA SEQUENCING
Stepwise Simplification: The three hospitals also wish to acquire automated DNA
sequencing equipment that will allow them to do in-house DNA analysis. After
reviewing available products, it is decided that the Illumina NovaSeq 5000 system,
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at an installed cost of $850,000, offers the best combination of features and
capacity. Based on anticipated volume, hospital X 1 requires 2.1 sequencers,
hospital X2 requires 1.4 sequencers, and hospital X3 requires .7 sequencers. Given
that only whole units can be purchased (that is, you cannot purchase fractional
sequencers), the joint venture will require the purchase of 5 machines. The
allocation to divide the $4,250,000 is:
Resource Cost
1 sequencer:
$850,000
2 sequencers: $1,700,000
3 sequencers: $2,550,000
4 sequencers: $3,400,000
5 sequencers: $4,250,000

Cost to “go it alone”
X1 = 2,550,000
X2 = 1,700,000
X3 = 850,000
=========
$ 5,100,000

Player Requirements
S(1):
2.1
$ 2,550,000
S(2):
1.4
$ 1,700,000
S(3):
.7
$ 850,000
S(12): 4.0
$ 3,400,000
S(13): 3.0
$ 2,550,000

S(23): 3.0
S(123): 5.0

$ 2,550,000
$ 4,250,000

Shapley Sharing Solution
X1 = 2,550,000 + ½(3,400,000-2,550,000-1,700,000) +
½(2,550,000-2,550,000-850,000) +
⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))

=

$ 1,983,333.33

X2 = 1,700,000 + ½(3,400,000-2,550,000-1,700,000) +
½(2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000) +
⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 –
2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))

=

$ 1,558,333.33

X3 = 850,000+ ½(2,550,000-2,550,000-850,000) +
½(2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000) +
⅓(4,250,000-(3,400,000+2,550,000+2,550,000 –
2,550,000-1,700,000-850,000))

=

$ 708,333.34
============
$ 4,250,000.00

COMPUTERS
Serial Simplification: The hospitals in the collaborative venture plan to purchase
computers to be used by in the clinic. Their requirements are as follows: hospital
X1 needs 10, hospital X2 needs 22, and hospital X3 needs 35. The notebook
computers cost $2,500 each and would not be shared between users. Without
quantity discounts, the cost division is as follows.
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Cost Each
$2,500

Player Requirements
S(1): 10
S(2): 22
S(3): 35

Jay Lightfoot

Shapley Sharing Solution
X1 = 10 * 2,500 = 25,000
X2 = 22 * 2,500 = 55,000
X3 = 35 * 2,500 = 87,500
=======
$ 167,500

Stepwise Simplification: Quantity discounts are common when purchasing large
numbers of computers, so assume that a volume purchasing agreement for
computers was negotiated with the following price schedule.
Quantity
1 to 10
11 to 25
26 to 50
> 51

Cost each
$2,500
$2,000
$1,800
$1,600

Using the stepwise simplification, the cost sharing solution for the joint purchase
would be:
Player Requirements
S(1):
10 * 2500 = $ 25,000
S(2):
22 * 2000 = $ 44,000
S(3):
35 * 1800 = $ 63,000
S(12):
32 * 1800 = $ 57,600
S(13):
45 * 1800 = $ 81,000
S(23):
57 * 1600 = $ 91,200
S(123): 67 * 1600 = $107,200

Cost to “go it alone”
X1 = 25,000
X2 = 44,000
X3 = 63,000
=======
$ 132,000

Shapley Sharing Solution
X1 = 25,000 + ½(57,600-25,000-44,000) + ½(81,000-25,000-63,000) +
⅓(107,200-(57,600+81,000+91,200-25,000-44,000-63,000)) =

$ 18,933.33

X2 = 44,000 + ½(57,600-25,000-44,000) + ½(91,200-44,000-63,000) +
⅓(107,200-(57,600+81,000+91,200-25,000-44,000-63,000)) =

$ 33,533.33

X3 = 63,000+ ½(81,000-25,000-63,000) + ½(91,200-44,000-63,000) + =
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$ 54,733.33
==========
$ 107,200.00
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